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Brown (Larry) v. State of Nevada, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 44 (June 23, 2022)1
Confrontation Clause
Summary
In this appeal, the Court considered whether a jury may consider footwear impression
evidence without the aid of expert testimony. The Court determined it was proper here. The
Court also considered whether the district court violated the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause by allowing a witness to testify via a two-way video and limiting crossexamination to protect proprietary trade secrets. The Court determined that the district court
failed to make express findings under Lipitz.2 The Court also concluded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by limiting witness testimony. No reversal was granted, and the court
affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History
The State indicted Larry Brown on charges that included conspiracy to commit robbery
with the use of a deadly weapon, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, murder with the use
of a deadly weapon, and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Mr. Brown
entered an Alford plea for the possession charge but went to trial for the remaining charges.3
These charges stemmed from the 2017 death of Kwame Banks who was shot and killed outside a
Las Vegas apartment complex. Detectives at the scene learned that before his death Banks
agreed to sell marijuana to Anthony Carter, Brown’s codefendant, and to an unidentified third
party. The detectives found Banks’ body lying between two cars in a pool of blood. They also
found two bullet cartridge cases, bloody shoe prints leading away from the body, and a torn latex
glove near the body with remnants also near the apartment complex exit. Officers also found a
black glove and three cell phones. Detectives were also able to obtain surveillance video that
showed a white SUV picking up an African American male and driving off.
The police investigated the three cell phones and learned that two belonged to Banks and
the third one was registered to Brown. Upon executing a search warrant for Brown’s home in
Atlanta, the white SUV and shoes that had prints which appeared to match the shoe prints at the
crime scene. Detectives further linked Brown’s DNA to both the torn latex glove and the black
cloth glove found at the scene. The murder weapon was never recovered. Detectives used
technology from a private company called Cellebrite to extract information from Bank’s phones.
Initially, Cellebrite was unable to access the information on the phone. The police then sent
Brown’s phone to Cellebrite, which again was unable to access the information on the phone.
After a software update and the issuance of a second search warrant, Brian Stofik at Cellebrite
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was able to extract the information. The extracted information contained a series of text
messages between Carter and Brown indicating that they were planning something involving an
identified third person. The messages included the address where the murder occurred and other
statements.
Before trial, Brown moved to strike evidence of footwear impressions, arguing that such
evidence required expert testimony. The State countered, noting that it would be showing the
shoeprint and the photograph of the shoes found at Brown’s residence later impounded into
evidence — as these were independently admissible. The district court denied the motion. Brown
also moved to preclude any cell phone information obtained from Cellebrite. Brown asserted that
he should be able to cross-examine Cellebrite about its software that allows for the duplication of
the phone’s data without reviewing the information on it. The district court agreed to have a
sealed hearing outside the jury’s presence to allow Brown to question Cellebrite’s witness prior
to his testimony at trial.
The State learned early during the trial that Brian Stofik would be unable to appear in
person. Stofik was testifying as to whether the copy of the phone returned to law enforcement
was accurate. The State argued that good cause existed to allow Stofik to testify audio visually.
Brown made a Crawford objection.4 The court concluded that Stofik could effectively testify
over two-way video.
Before Stofik testified, the district court held a sealed hearing during which Stofik
explained Cellebrite’s process for receiving and returning phones and for extracting information
from those phones. Stofik was not the employee who attempted to extract the information the
first time. Brown then made a Crawford objection arguing that he had the right to confront all
involved Cellebrite employees about the chain of custody. Brown also argued that that evidence
was not properly authenticated. The district court concluded that the proprietary coding and
programming did not need to be presented to the jury because of its complicated nature. The
district court overruled the objections and allowed the parties to question Stofik regarding how
Cellebrite-downloaded and returned the phone information with ensuring its accuracy.
The State also introduced photographs of the bloodied footwear impression taken at the
crime scene. While the prosecution did not ask any witness at trial to compare the crime scene
photographs against the shoes recovered from Brown’s residence, during closing arguments the
State suggested that the jury should compare them during deliberations. Banks presented
evidence to counter the inference that he fled to Atlanta following the crime and that he fled
officers once in Atlanta. Brown testified that he learned of the murder after he returned to
Atlanta. Brown was asked about the text messages to Carter on cross-examination. Brown
testified that he did not know what the text message about the knife meant. Brown also testified
that the text about the address of the crime was on his phone because he dropped Carter off or
4

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

picked him up at that location. Brown denied ever having been at the location. The jury
convicted Brown on all counts, leading to an aggregate sentence of thirty years and four months
to life in prison. The appeal followed.

Discussion
Brown raised several arguments on appeal, two of which are addressed in the opinion.
First, whether the district court improperly submitted evidence of the bloodied footwear without
regarding expert testimony; and second, whether the district court violated Brown’s rights under
the Confrontation Clause by allowing Stofik to testify via two-way video and by limiting the
scope of his testimony to avoid disclosing trade secrets.
The footwear impression evidence in this case was admissible without expert testimony
Brown argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting footwear
impression evidence without forensic expert testimony. He contends that the jury needed expert
testimony to properly consider the footwear impression evidence admitted at trial, and that the
State’s suggestion during closing argument that the jury could compare the evidence was
improper.5 Relevant evidence is generally admissible, and laypersons may draw inferences that
are both rationally based on the observer’s perception and helpful to determine a fact in issue.
Expert testimony is needed “to provide the trier of fact with a resource for ascertaining truth in
relevant areas outside the ken of ordinary laity.”6 The Court had never addressed the issue of
whether comparing footwear impressions is within the ordinary range of knowledge or whether
such evidence requires an expert’s explanation.
A survey of other jurisdictions revealed differing conclusions. The Court concluded that a
juror may make personal observations and draw general inferences regarding the similarities
between footwear impressions and footwear. The Court further concluded that such evidence
generally need not be supported by expert testimony to be admissible. The Court noted that the
photographs of the bloodied shoe prints near Banks’s body and the shoes found in Brown’s
girlfriend’s home are independently relevant circumstantial evidence.7 Further, the photograph of
the footwear impression evidence was admitted for the jury’s overall observation, and the State
elicited no testimony during trial regarding the evidence that would require specialized testimony
for the jury to understand. While expert testimony may have helped the jury, it did not render the
photograph inadmissible or require an expert testimony to be independently admissible.8
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The prosecutor did not improperly argue during closing that during deliberations the jury
should compare the footwear impressions to the shoes found in Brown’s residence. Once
evidence is admitted during trial, the prosecutor can argue inferences from that evidence. The
Court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the footwear
impression without accompanying witness testimony.
The district court did not violate Brown’s rights under the Confrontation Clause
Brown argued that the district court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause
and that the district court improperly limited his ability to cross-examine. “The Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”9 The Court reviewed this case
de novo because there is a question of law.10
The district court did not improperly limit witness testimony
A criminal defendant has the right to “explore and challenge through cross-examination
the basis of an expert witness’s opinion.”11 The defendant’s right to confrontation is not
unlimited and does not entitle the defense to “cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent, the defendant might wish.”12 The district court can place reasonable
limits on cross-examination. The Court had never addressed whether a court may limit testimony
in a criminal trial to protect proprietary rights in trade secrets. Both Nevada and federal law
accord special protection to trade secrets in civil litigation. A court should consider whether the
cross-examination is designed to harass, annoy, or humiliate the witness, whether it could cause
prejudice, place the witness in danger, and whether it would confuse the issues, be repetitive of
other testimony, be speculative or vague, or only marginally relevant.13
The Court concluded that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by limiting
cross-examination. The record does not show that limiting the testimony left the jury with
insufficient information to judge Stofik’s credibility regarding the core issues or that a
reasonable jury would have received a significantly different impression of Stofik’s credibility
had the district court not limited the scope of cross-examination. Brown’s own testimony
independently established the accuracy of the text messages. The Court determined that the
district court did not violate the Confrontation Clause by limiting Stofik’s testimony to avoid
disclosing Cellebrite’s trade secrets.
CONCLUSION
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The Court concluded that the jury could consider photographs of footwear impressions
along with Brown’s shoes without the aid of an expert witness. Both pieces of evidence were
independently admissible as circumstantial evidence. The Court further determined a reversal is
not warranted for the district court's failure to make express findings under Lipsitz v. State
regarding the use of a two-way video for a witness testimony. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by limiting the cross-examination of a witness to avoid disclosing trade secrets. The
Court affirmed the conviction.

